I INTRODUCTION
The Natal Code of Zulu Law is a product of early colonialism 1 and its counterpart, the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law, is a product of the apartheid era. 2 In South Africa's new constitutional order, they stand out as incongruous elements. Speaking of a similar legacy of the past regime, the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, Sachs J remarked: 'It is painful that the Act still survives at all. The concepts on which it was based, the memories it evokes, the language it continues to employ, and the division it still enforces, are antithetical to the society envisaged by the Constitution'. 3 Although the Justice Laws Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996 removed most legislation of this nature, the two Codes were spared. This article explores the case for their repeal.
II ORIGINS OF THE CODES
The origins of the Natal Code lie in a decision -which was advanced for the time -to recognise customary law. When Britain annexed Natal in 1843, Roman-Dutch law was declared the law of the land. 4 Although it was clearly impossible to impose this system on the large number of Africans in the colony, Britain's civilizing mission demanded 'amalgamation of the different races' under a single system of European law and governance. 5 A conflicting strand of thinking in colonial policy, however, demanded respect for local institutions. Hence, in 1848, a Royal instruction announced that: 'Her Majesty had not interfered with or abrogated any law, custom or usage previously prevailing among the native inhabitants, except so far as the same might be repugnant to the general principles of humanity recognised throughout the whole civilised world'.
6 Accordingly, Ordinance 3 of the following year provided that the courts were to apply customary law provided that it was 'not repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed throughout the civilized world '. 7 In 1852, the Natal administration established a commission to investigate the situation of the colony's African population. In the Commission's view, uniform management was essential if they were to be effectively governed. It found that magistrates in the colony were administering different types of customary law, based on their own ideas of what that law happened to be. It also found -which was probably more disquieting -that Africans were noting and commenting on the contradictory decisions. Hence, in order to achieve the aim of uniform decision-making, the Commission recommended that customary law be reduced to writing: 'a full and complete digest of the rules and principles . . . for the guidance of Magistrates'. 8 Lieutenant-Governor Pine accepted the Commission's findings. He could personally confirm that magistrates were experiencing great difficulty in administering customary law, mainly because they had only a sketchy knowledge of the subject. Contemporary experts in colonial development also supported the case for codification, because they believed that reducing local customs to writing would encourage the transformation of indigenous law into a more civilized system. 9 At this point, however, further progress was barred, for the project met the steadfast opposition of Theophilus Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent and Secretary of Native Affairs for the Colony. Shepstone, who had been responsible for co-opting traditional leaders to colonial government, was a self-proclaimed authority on African life. He was completely opposed to the idea of codification, on the ground that it would impart an artificial rigidity to customary law. Hence, for over 20 years, he managed to stall the project by saying that it was impossibly difficult to achieve. 10 Eventually, however, the Natal Legislative Council procured a section in the Native Administration Law of 1875 that forced Shepstone to begin the job.
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The resulting product was a disappointment. As a statement of current social practice, which is the basis for all customary law, the Code was far from accurate. 12 Moreover, the rules were framed in such a vague and generalised fashion that magistrates were still left free to follow their own interpretations. In consequence, the colonial government decided to prepare another version, 13 and a new draft of the Code appeared in 1878. Like its predecessor, however, it bore little relation to the reality of customary law.
14 More amendments were necessary, and these had to be performed by the colony's Legislative Council. Because very few members of the Council knew anything about customary law, the process was both lengthy and ill informed. Eventually, in 1891, however, a more acceptable Code appeared. 15 While the various drafts of the Code were being debated, the Zulu kingdom continued to maintain a precarious independence from Britain. Finally, in 1887, the territory was annexed. In the same year, the 1878 draft version of the Code was made law for Zululand. 16 It was only in 1927 that a single law became applicable to both Zululand and Natal: the Native Administration Act declared the 1891 Code law for the entire province. 17 Because of the procedural difficulties involved in amending the Code, it remained in force notwithstanding its many flaws. The answer to this problem was seen to lie in transferring legislative power away from Parliament to the executive. 'One or two experienced hands' would then be able to keep the Code abreast of social change. 18 Hence, in 1927, the Native Administration Act 19 vested law-making power in the GovernorGeneral (who then delegated his power to the Department of Native Affairs). Thereafter, the Code could be amended by the simple expedient of issuing executive proclamations. By this means it was significantly revised in 1932. 20 More changes followed in 1967 21 and again in 1987.
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The latter is the current version of the Natal Code. For purposes of applying the 1932 and 1967 versions of the Code, Zululand was treated as part of Natal. In 1972, however, the territory gained partial autonomy from South Africa under the Bantu Homelands (subsequently National States) Constitution Act 21 of 1971. As an entity separate from Natal, KwaZulu now had certain legislative powers over the people and territory under its jurisdiction. 23 Acting on these powers, the government appointed a Commission to inquire into the legal status of women. Instead of implementing the Commission's proposals by amendment to the existing Code, however, the cabinet decided to review the enactment as a whole. 24 Hence, in 1981, KwaZulu issued its own Code of Zulu law, which was much the same as the Natal Code but with certain improvements to female status. 25 This Code was amended in 1984 26 and then revised and reissued in 1985.
III APPLICATION OF THE CODES
Laws may be considered applicable to territory or persons. Systems of customary law, especially their private law provisions, are, in principle, applicable to persons. As a result, those who are associated with such systems remain bound wherever they happen to be. 28 Other laws are applicable to territories. This proposition is especially true of public laws, which are generally deemed binding on everyone within a state, depending, in some cases, on whether an individual is resident, physically present or a citizen of the state concerned. Both the Natal and KwaZulu Codes purport, in the main, to be codifications of the Zulu customary law of persons, marriage, succession and delict. They might therefore have been expected to apply to Zulu people, wherever they happened to be. The Codes also contain certain public law provisions that were intended to give effect to government policy. One would therefore expect these provisions to apply to everyone within the territories of Natal or KwaZulu regardless of an individual's system of customary law. These expectations were not realised either in the practice of the courts or the state's administration.
The courts have consistently applied the Natal Code to all Africans living within the borders of the province. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of race, their approach was correct when they were applying public law provisions. For private law provisions, however, this approach was quite wrong, because most of these provisions concerned personal relationships, and, for such matters, the Code should have been applied to the inhabitants of Natal only if consistent with their cultural orientation.
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The courts nevertheless upheld a principle of territoriality. Thus, where people normally subject to Sotho law settled in Natal, they were deemed to be subject to the provisions of the Code even though, notionally at least, it reflected Zulu law. 30 The contradiction between principles of personality and territoriality became apparent in another situation. Where people from Natal moved to other parts of South Africa, the Code ceased to apply. Although no authoritative decision was taken on this point, dicta again indicated that the Code applied only within the borders of the province.
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The same approach seems to have been maintained towards application of the KwaZulu Code. Public law provisions applied within KwaZulu, and, as far as conflicts with systems of customary law outside the territory were concerned, it seems to have been assumed that the Code should also be applied on the basis of territoriality. As far as conflicts with laws in Natal were concerned, however, a new criterion for application appeared: citizenship.
Whenever the KwaZulu Code diverged from the laws applicable in 29 The reason for this aberration may have been the status of the colony when the Code was first issued. Because Natal was a separate political entity, independent of the other colonies, protectorates and republics in southern Africa, the Code was applied only within the area over which the Natal legislature had jurisdiction. This term was defined in s 1 of the Code to mean anyone who was a citizen of the territory in terms of the National States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970. 33 The Natal Code had no corresponding provision. Hence, there was no indication whether citizens of KwaZulu were exempt from its provisions.
While the courts (understandably) stepped very lightly across this minefield of rules, application of the Codes is fraught with contradictions. 34 The re-creation of a unified South Africa might have brought an end to this unhappy state of affairs, but, for the sake of a smooth transition, the interim Constitution provided that all laws in areas forming part of the new national territory would continue in force. 35 Thus, although Natal and KwaZulu were amalgamated into one province in 1994, 36 nothing was done to end the anomaly of two different Codes applying in one political unit.
IV DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE CODES
With the introduction of a justiciable Bill of Rights, doubt was cast over the validity of many sections of the Codes, and some, at least, have been repealed. Those encoding the traditional idea of patriarchal authority, for instance, were removed by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, 37 and more amendments will follow if effect is given to the Law Commission's recommendations for reform of the customary law of intestate succession.
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Despite these reforms, many of the remaining provisions are at odds with the Bill of Rights. 39 The aim of this article, however, is not to 40 In the first place, the Codes owe their existence to a system that was designed to deprive black South Africans of fundamental rights. In the second place, race, ethnicity or citizenship remain the terms for applying rules that are distinct fromand usually more onerous than -rules applicable to other members of the South African population. In consequence, the Codes constitute an invasion of the right to human dignity -which is the most basic principle of the Constitution. 41 An obvious feature of the Codes is their differentiation between people on the basis of race, tribe (or ethnic origin) and citizenship. The first two of these, in particular, constitute a potential violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal treatment or non-discrimination. 42 In the case of the Natal Code, differentiation is based squarely on race: the enactment repeatedly states that its provisions apply to 'blacks'. 43 What is more, the Black Administration Act provides that the Natal Code is in force 'as law for Blacks in Natal'. 44 It can therefore be argued that, in relation to non-blacks, blacks are subject to different, and nearly always disadvantageous, forms of treatment. Although the reference to blacks is found mainly, as might be expected, in the public law provisions, 45 it also occurs in certain provisions regulating private law. 46 This reference cannot be considered inadvertent, for it dates back to the time when customary law had far less to do with cultural orientation than with race.
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When a provision of the Natal Code dealing with private law is not racially marked, the courts are free to decide whether to apply customary or the common law to a cause of action. Section 105(1) provides that nothing in the Code impairs the operation of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988, s 1 of which governs the choice of law process in South Africa at large. 48 Through this section, a black person may escape the operation of at least some provisions of the Code. For example, s 98(1) provides that 'the seduction of an unmarried female shall give rise to an action against the seducer in damages for the ngquthu beast'. If a case were to arise where parties had a 'Western' cultural orientation, the court could apply the common law instead of s 98(1), which might well result in the defendant escaping liability. 50 In these provisions, if a black person is involved, the ordinary choice of law rules are superseded by the overriding consideration of race, and so common law may not be applied in place of customary law.
In the final analysis, however, the constitutionality of both the Natal and KwaZulu Codes does not depend on the text making explicit references to race. A law that is, on the face of it, racially neutral can be discriminatory if it is applied in a manner that discriminates on the basis of race. In the case of the Codes, although many provisions make no reference to race, they have consistently been applied only to blacks. Section 9(3) of the Constitution prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination. The former denotes a situation where an individual or group is 'disadvantaged simply on the ground of her or his race, sex, ethnicity, religion or whatever the distinguishing feature(s) may be'.
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The practice of applying the Codes only to blacks is an instance of directly discriminatory conduct. Indirect discrimination emphasises the result rather than the form of the law. In other words, laws that appear non-discriminatory, may nonetheless produce a disparate, discriminatory effect 52 on a particular race group. In such cases, the discrimination is indirect. 53 Even where the term 'black' is not used in provisions of the Codes, it may be argued that, by virtue of the fact that they attempt to codify Zulu customary law, 54 the Codes affect a disproportionately larger number of black people than those of another race group. In the case of the two Codes, a discriminatory effect is produced by the fact that they impose duties on the black inhabitants of Natal and KwaZulu that are more onerous than duties borne by other citizens of South Africa under the national law. 55 The second form of discrimination is the Natal and KwaZulu Codes is based on tribe. Certain provisions in the Codes are aimed at securing the jurisdiction of chiefs, 56 which in turn depends on subjects being affiliated to particular 'tribes'. Although the Codes do not make provision for the acquisition or loss of tribal membership, s 3(1) of the Natal Code contains a deeming provision: 'a Black shall be deemed to be a member of a tribe of the chief within whose area of jurisdiction he resides'. Residence, in this case, is not entirely voluntary, because s 3(2) continues to provide that 'any Black who disregards any tribal boundary duly defined . . . and without authority . . . moves from the area of any tribe to that of another shall be guilty of an offence '. 57 Citizenship is the third ground of discrimination. The KwaZulu Code has many provisions indicating that it applies only to citizens of the former self-governing territory. 58 Under the National States Citizenship As a result, individuals could find themselves bound by the Code even though they did not live in the former KwaZulu and have never considered themselves to be 'Zulu'. Although differentiation on the basis of citizenship is not specifically prohibited in s 9(3) of the Constitution, along with race and ethnic origin, it is also tantamount to unfair discrimination, as will become apparent below.
V ESTABLISHING AND JUSTIFYING UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION
Section 9 of the Constitution prohibits only unfair discrimination.
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Relevant subsections read as follows: From these provisions, it follows that a discriminatory law must be considered constitutionally valid if it can be shown to be 'fair'. When the basis for discrimination is a ground listed in s 9(3), however, s 9(5) presumes the law to be unfair. Once unfairness has been shown to exist, the respondent still has an opportunity to justify the unfair discrimination under s 36, the general limitation clause.
(a) Discrimination
In light of s 9, the following courses of action are available to applicants intending to contest the constitutionality of a law. Where they can show that the law differentiates on the basis of a ground listed in s 9(3), the court may presume that discrimination exists and that such discrimina- The peculiarly South African distinction between fair and unfair discrimination was intended to ensure that certain kinds of discrimination, notably affirmative action programmes, would be permissible, because they would be aimed at achieving equality for all. Thus, the inclusion of 'unfair' in s 9 allows account to be taken of the social and historical context within which tion is unfair (it is, of course, still open to the respondent to attempt to rebut the presumptions). As ethnic origin and race are grounds listed in s 9(3), it can be presumed that the Natal Code discriminates unfairly.
In the case of citizenship, there is no presumption to assist applicants who wish to establish unfair discrimination. Instead, they would first need to establish that the differentiation amounts to discrimination. In this regard, however, the Constitutional Court has been willing to accept that discrimination exists if differentiation is based on an attribute or characteristic that has 'the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of persons as human beings, or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner'. 62 In the case of citizenship, this is not a difficult burden to discharge. Indeed, the Constitutional Court, in Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North-West Province), 63 found the ground of citizenship to be such an attribute or characteristic. The basis for the court's finding was that citizenship is a personal attribute that is difficult to change 64 and that foreigners are always a minority with little political influence. Hence, continuing to differentiate between people on the basis of homeland citizenship amounts to discrimination.
(b) Unfairness
Having established the discriminatory nature of both the Natal and KwaZulu Codes, the next step is to decide whether the discrimination is unfair. 65 According to the Constitutional Court, the inquiry centres on the effect of discrimination on a person in the applicant's position. This analysis requires reference to the following factors:
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage . . . (b) the nature of the provision or power and the purpose sought to be achieved by it . . . (c) with due regard to (a) and (b) above, and any other relevant factors, the extent to which the discrimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and whether it has led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an impairment of a comparably serious nature. 66 62 Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 46. Note that it has also been suggested that an inquiry into discrimination on a non-listed ground is not based strictly on the above formulation. The Constitutional Court 'regards differentiation as discrimination whenever it is based on a ground that the complainant cannot change or cannot reasonably be expected to (i) The position of the complainants in society While s 9 protects 'everyone's' right to equality, discrimination against previously disadvantaged persons, or those who are socially vulnerable, is more likely to be unfair, because it exacerbates existing disadvantage and indignity. 67 At the time the Natal Code was drafted, its clear purpose was to establish a separate system of governance for a subordinate section of the population. Indeed, much of the writing on the history of segregation shows how the Code functioned to maintain the inferior position of the African population.
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The KwaZulu Code operates somewhat differently, because it applies not to blacks but to citizens. Again, however, the Code maintains the inferior position of blacks as notional 'foreigners' in South Africa. In Bangindawo v Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority, 69 it was argued that the concept of such citizenship infringed both s 1 of the Constitution, which constitutes a single sovereign state, and s 5(1), which provides for only one South African citizenship. Similarly, in Rehman v Minister of Home Affairs, 70 the idea of separate citizenships in South Africa was rejected, because it offended the principle of a unified state under the Constitution and because the administrative means for enforcing homeland citizenship laws no longer existed. 71 The Court in Larbi-Odam v MEC for Education (North-West Province) 72 provides the final, and most telling comment about the old homeland citizenship system.
[The] general lack of control over one's citizenship has particular resonance in the South African context, where individuals were deprived of rights or benefits, ostensibly on the basis of citizenship, but in reality in circumstances where citizenship was governed by race. Many became statutory foreigners in their own country under the Bantustan policy, and the legislature even managed to create remarkable beings called 'foreign natives'.
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(ii) The nature and purpose of the discriminatory law
Here the main concern is to establish whether the law is aimed at achieving 'a worthy and important societal goal'. 74 Because the nature and purpose of a discriminatory law arises in the context of unfairness under s 9 and then, again, in the context of justifiability under s 36, the applicant must be prepared to argue about the nature and purpose of a law twice. 75 Although there is no obvious distinction between these two inquiries, and although the procedure has been criticised for needless duplication, 76 some writers have suggested that unfairness under s 9 is a test of 'internal' justification. As a result, if the purpose of a law is to be considered at this stage of an inquiry, it must relate to the promotion of equality itself. 77 Other justifications, such as administrative convenience and legal certainty, are more appropriately considered as part of the inquiry under s 36.
Of all possible purposes for having the Codes, the most socially important is likely to be the protection of a right to culture. In fact, protecting culture has the effect of promoting equality, because the community concerned can then secure its position vis-a`-vis other, usually more powerful, communities.
78 Today, it would probably be argued that the primary purpose of the Codes is to safeguard Zulu culture, since the term 'Zulu' or 'Zulu law' is mentioned frequently in the text. 79 These terms presuppose the existence of a Zulu people practising this legal system.
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There are several flaws, however, in an argument for retaining the Codes in order to protect a Zulu cultural tradition. In the first place, many, if not most, of the provisions are not peculiarly 'Zulu'. They are administrative measures that have nothing to do with culture. 81 second place, although the term Zulu is usually taken to apply to those whose first language is Zulu, 82 the existence of a homogeneous Zulu culture -let alone a homogeneous system of Zulu customary law -is highly questionable. 83 In fact, rather than protecting a pre-existing Zulu culture, the Codes themselves seem to have contributed towards the creation of a somewhat artificial conception of that culture. As we have already seen, prior to the introduction of the Natal Code, the courts recognised a diversity of laws (and by implication cultures) in the colony. Even after the Code was promulgated, the courts continued to recognise this diversity. Gradually, however, constant reference to the Code resulted in the withdrawal of official recognition from local customs and the emergence of one body of rules, which was deemed 'Zulu' customary law. 84 If continued application of the Code has this effect, then the freedom to practise a culture of choice is defeated and, with it, the main reason for protecting cultural diversity. 85 In the third place, and related to the point above, culture is not a fixed and immutable set of rules, and any attempt to make it so may lead to violation of the right to culture. For this reason, it is argued that the right to culture demands application of what is called a 'living', not an 'official', version of customary law. 86 The two Codes are a perfect example of official law. 87 Indeed, the very process of codification creates such law. 88 With regard to the carrying of traditional weapons, for instance, it has been held that: the era since 1891 has been dominated by the Code and marked by its impact on every practice which clashed with it, on every practice by which dangerous weapons were carried when it forbade them to be. A century of proscription makes it hard to regard any such practice nowadays as a traditional one. For the enactment and endurance of the Code must have tended to suppress the tradition, if it existed previously, and to prevent it from ever taking root, if it did not. 89 Fourthly, a group may not insist on its right to culture, if to do so entails subjecting an individual to that culture against his or her will.
90 A right to culture implies that people living according to a particular cultural tradition may require the state to enforce and protect institutions peculiar to that tradition. Thus, the right is opposable, in the first instance, against the state, rather than individuals, who must be free to explore other cultural traditions of their own choice. 91 It follows that the individual's right to equal treatment -which could be defeated by application of a culturally defined system of personal law -generally supersedes the right to culture. Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution make this clear by the inclusion of an 'internal limitation' clause, namely, a clause providing that the right to culture must be read subject to the Bill of Rights.
On the other hand, when an individual is associated with a particular cultural community, he or she may reasonably expect to be bound by the laws that constitute the community. Such is the basis for recognition and application of customary law in South Africa. 92 Nevertheless, in specific cases, the courts have required some indication of an individual's voluntary submission to the laws of that community, whether expressly or by implication from prior transactions, behaviour and general cultural orientation. 93 In other words, individuals may not be involuntarily bound to a system of personal law indefinitely.
The Natal and KwaZulu Codes, however, pay little regard to individual volition. All blacks in Natal and all citizens of KwaZulu must comply with the public law provisions of their respective Codes. As for the private law provisions, an individual may escape the Codes only if he or she has agreed with the other party to application of a different system of customary law. 94 Even so, blacks are, in practice, presumed to be bound by the Codes. hand, look to the general tenor of the Constitution, and conclude that it is in favour of an individual right to non-discrimination rather than a group right to culture. 91 Under s 8(2) of the Constitution, individuals may bear duties as well as rights, but only where this is 'applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right'. The duty to protect and promote culture will fall largely to the state because the state has the capacity to fulfil these functions. Private persons could be obliged to respect a group's right to culture, but it should be noted that the right to culture, as laid down in ss 30 and 31, whether applied against the state or a private person, is itself subject to the Bill of Rights, notably, of course, the right to freedom from discrimination on the ground of culture under s 9(3). Formerly, individuals could be specifically exempted from the Natal Code. This possibility was introduced in 1864 96 to cater for Christianised Africans and to ward off criticisms that the Colony was doing nothing to promote higher standards among the African population. 97 A similar procedure, which applied nationwide, was introduced in 1927 by the Black Administration Act. 98 Although the option was eventually omitted from the Codes, it is still available in terms of national law. Not surprisingly, however, the exemption procedure has proved decidedly unpopular 99 and the Law Commission has recommended its repeal.
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Retention of the Codes advances no worthy social interest. Whilst protection of culture is an important societal goal, it is debatable whether the Codes actually do embody an authentic Zulu culture. Furthermore, protection of culture has always to be weighed against other rights and the enforcement of the Codes constitutes a serious infringement of the individual's freedom of choice. In Natal, for instance, the first letter of exemption was granted only 11 years after the procedure had been introduced, and, by 1900, only 1 252 letters had been granted. See Mesthrie (note 68 above) 47. Moreover, the effect of exemption was never entirely clear. Africans believed that it entitled them to the same legal status as whites, but here they were disappointed. Although the courts were prepared to apply common law to exempted persons for purposes of domestic relations, they refused to grant immunity from racist legislation. Thus Africans remained subject to the curfew laws in Durban and to the jurisdiction of commissioners' courts: impeached by any person, is entitled to damages'. Not only does this section appear to infringe freedom of expression (which is protected under s 16 of the Constitution) but it also perpetuates a gender stereotype that is arguably discriminatory. In addition, the Codes create a number of offences that have the effect of requiring an unusually onerous standard of behaviour for blacks in Natal and for citizens in KwaZulu. Section 115(1)(a) of the Codes, for example, provides that any person who 'spreads any false report of a nature calculated to cause disquiet and anxiety, or affecting the Government [of KwaZulu] and its acts . . . shall be guilty of an offence'; 101 similarly, s 115(1)(e) establishes seduction of an unmarried woman as an offence.
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In conclusion, the discrimination and impairment of dignity that flows from enforcement of the Codes cannot be justified by any valuable societal objective. Once this conclusion is reached, it is clear that the law in question discriminates unfairly on the basis of race, ethnicity or citizenship (or a combination of these grounds), and the respondent may proceed to a second stage of justification.
(c) Limitation
This inquiry entails argument under s 36 of the Constitution, the general limitation clause. A right protected in the Bill of Rights may be limited only by a 'law of general application'. 103 The Codes would certainly qualify as 'law', for the term has been interpreted widely to include both original and delegated legislation, as well as the common and customary law. 104 More pertinent, for our purposes, is whether the Codes should be considered to be 'publicly accessible', in the sense that those who are bound must know what is expected of them. 105 Although particular provisions in the Codes may be challenged for being too broad, they are still reasonably certain. 106 In addition, the law must not arbitrarily target specific or easily ascertainable individuals or groups of individuals. 107 This requirement does not mean that the law has to be uniformly applied across South Africa. 108 The Codes are likely to pass this first, and not very demanding, leg of the limitation analysis, because the targeting of a specific group in this case cannot be said to be arbitrary: it is based on race, ethnicity and citizenship.
The second leg of the limitation analysis balances the purpose sought by the law against the extent to which the Bill of Rights is infringed. 109 As indicated above, an argument based on the right to culture is unlikely to succeed, because the existence of the Codes is connected in only the most tortuous way to the protection of culture.
It is submitted, then, that there is no rational connection between the Codes and the purpose they are supposed to serve. Even if there were, less restrictive means for achieving that purpose are available -which is evident in the fact that most systems of customary law are applied in South Africa without the need for their codification. In other words, recognition of 'living' customary law adequately serves the purpose of protecting a cultural identity and constitutes a less invasive violation of the right to equality. On a balance, then, the right to culture is outweighed in favour of the right to equality.
Other possible justifications will, it is argued, suffer a similar fate. Historically, the Natal Code was intended to bring certainty to the administration of justice and no doubt the parts of both the Natal and KwaZulu Codes that codify customary law still serve the same purpose. 110 At the outset, however, it must be appreciated that legal certainty benefits two distinct groups: officials engaged in the administration of justice and the legal subjects themselves. Originally, the intention of producing the Natal Code was to benefit the former group, because it was aimed at easing a magistrate's burden in applying customary law. 111 Arguably, this group is still the principal beneficiary. Legal certainty has always been difficult to attain in systems of customary law. These laws derive from the practices of particular communities, and not only may the practices vary considerably from place to place but they are also changing constantly over time. From the perspective of a Western legal tradition, application of such rules is a daunting prospect, because lawyers need a stable and certain code that can be consistently applied to the facts of a variety of different cases. 112 Moreover, because judges and magistrates are socially, and often geographically, distant from the communities they serve, they have no direct access to customary law. Seen in these terms, the variability of oral custom is antithetical to the administration of justice.
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The Constitutional Court has found administrative and legal convenience to be a reasonable basis for limiting rights, 114 although it is still questionable whether this factor can function as a justification on its own. In Moseneke v The Master, 115 however, the Constitutional Court held that, even if an administrative system held practical advantages for the people bound by it, where that system was rooted in racial discrimination, the dignity of those concerned was severely assailed and the attempt to establish a fair and equitable public administration was undermined.
116 As a result, it seems that considerations of legal certainty and convenience cannot be used as the sole basis on which to justify the Codes when the same enactments are responsible for serious intrusions on fundamental rights and freedoms.
A better ground of justification is that the Codes give the people of KwaZulu-Natal a sense of security by allowing them immediate access to the law. The right to know the law is an old precept, one that is basic to the rule of law. Indeed, it seems that, in the 19th century, Africans were often confused and indignant at their subjection to a patchwork of different laws. At a meeting called in 1863, a speaker summed up the general opinion of the gathering by saying that 'he did not know how many laws there were in Natal. English, [Customary] , and Roman Dutch he had heard of. There was also a mixture of all; by all of which the native got the worst of it'. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that the speaker called for the law to be written down. 117 In so far as the Codes facilitate the individual's right to know the law, therefore, they are unobjectionable. But legal certainty has been won at the cost of distorting social reality. Any code reflects the law only more or 112 The divergence between what is stated in the text and actual custom, however, must be considered in light of s 211(3) of the Constitution. This section provides that: 'The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law'. It has been forcefully argued that the customary law referred to here is the 'living law', namely, law currently being observed by South African communities. The so-called 'official' law, which is law captured in codes, precedents, legislation and textbooks, does not enjoy the same degree of constitutional protection. 119 In South Africa, outside KwaZulu-Natal, litigants are entitled to depart from the official version of customary law in order to plead a more authentic, 'living' version. 120 Within the province, however, this option is not permitted, because, wherever the Codes contain a provision on customary law, that provision is binding to the exclusion of any other version of the rule. 121 Again, people in KwaZulu-Natal suffer disadvantage in comparison with the rest of the South African population.
In summary, magistrates and administrators are most likely to benefit from the sense of legal certainty provided by the Codes. Historically, the drive for codification came from this group, which favoured a rule of law accountable to the administration. 122 Thus, the net effect of codification 'was to shift control of African law away from Africans and place it in the hands of white administrators and magistrates'. 123 Indeed, the African population of Natal had no formal say in the content of the Natal Code. 124 
VI CONCLUSION: THE PROCEDURE FOR CONTESTING THE CODES
The emphasis on dignity (although criticised) remains at the centre of any argument seeking to justify discriminatory laws. 125 Because the Codes apply on grounds offensive to the Constitution and because the subjects of these enactments are not free to escape their application, fundamental human dignity is impaired. 126 The Black Administration Act, which has a history and content comparable with the Codes, has been described as 'an egregious apartheid law which anachronistically has survived our transition to a non-racial democracy'. 127 Subordinate legislation passed under the Act generated what has been described as a demeaning and racist system that did not befit a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 128 As has been argued above, it is unlikely that this impairment to dignity will be found to be justifiable under s 36. What is more, the Codes are steeped in colonialism and apartheid politics.
When action is to be taken to repeal the Codes, however, it should preferably proceed from the state, not the courts. Although Du Plessis v De Klerk 129 held that an individual could challenge any rule of statutory law, the Court drew back from licensing the judiciary to undertake a general law reform. It said that, if particular rules were struck down, gaps would result, and the courts were in no position to fill the gaps. 130 The Constitutional Court noted that the same problem would arise if a statutory rule were declared invalid, because, in order to avoid creating a gap, the courts would have to reinstate the pre-statutory common or customary law, which itself would very probably be in conflict with the fundamental rights. 131 Partly for this reason, legislation was the function of elected members of Parliament, not an unelected judiciary. 132 national legislature may intervene only if the criteria set in s 44(2) of the Constitution are met, 135 namely, that a national law is the only way for effectively regulation or such a law is necessary to promote or protect certain national interests (which include security, the economy, promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services and protection of the environment).
In view of the fact that the government of KwaZulu-Natal has given no indication of bringing the Codes into line with the Constitution, it may be necessary to proceed by way of public-interest litigation. The applicant would therefore be advised to seek a suspended order of invalidity, which would allow the KwaZulu-Natal legislature time to take appropriate action. 136 
